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Abstract. In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining pro-
cedure whose equilibria converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining
vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about
personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since
this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic founda-
tion for the personalized taxes inherent to the Lindahl solution to the public goods
problem.
1. Introduction
The private provision of public goods in general leads to ineﬃcient allocations in
a competitive market environment. This ineﬃciency is often attributed to a missing
market. If personalized markets could be created that individually price the public
good for each agent, then a competitive equilibrium could implement an eﬃcient
allocation. For an economy with public goods, this outcome is known as a Lin-
dahl equilibrium. Typically, however, a Lindahl equilibrium is deemed unrealistic
because of a serious shortcoming: in the personalized markets upon which it rests
the agents are assumed to have a price-taking behavior. But unfortunately, by the
personalized nature of those markets, there is only one single agent on the demand
side in each of them, which makes price-taking behavior of this single agent an
utterly unrealistic assumption. On contrast, we propose in this paper a bargaining
procedure that leads (without the need of assuming price-taking behavior) to an
outcome arbitrarily close to a Lindahl allocation as the cost of bargaining vanishes.
As a matter of fact, the two only agents of our model (for the sake of simplicity)
have quite on the contrary a lot of market power.
In the case of a missing market (as it happens in the presence of a public good),
one way to allocate the surplus left unappropriated is through Coasian bargaining.
As pointed by Coase, as long as there remain gains from trade the parties involved
have incentives to get together and strike a deal. The main feature of such bargain-
ing is that it is decentralized (no benevolent government must intervene), and the
extent to which the surplus can be allocated to the parties depends on the details
of the bargaining protocol and on whether the bargaining is costly or not.
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1The study of this type of bargaining in legislatures has already been addressed in
Baron and Ferejohn (1989), where a model is presented in which one of the diﬀerent
possible ways to divide a given pie is chosen by a vote according to the majority
rule. It turns out that typically there exist many equilibria for this procedure.
Banks and Duggan (2000) present a far more general model in which the space
of alternatives is a compact, convex subset of a multidimensional Euclidean space.
They consider arbitrary voting rules and prove the existence of stationary equilib-
ria, the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium proposals in structural and preference
parameters, and a core equivalence result. While several of these bargaining set-ups
encompass economies with public goods, they diﬀer from our own set-up in that
ours implicitly imposes constraints on what the proposer is able to oﬀer to other
agents. We believe these constraints reﬂect in a natural way the sharing of power
in a bargaining situation over both the output level and the ﬁnancing of a public
good. At any rate, as a consequence of imposing such constraints on the oﬀers, the
bargaining protocol considered here allows to attain (in the limiting case of vanish-
ing bargaining costs) the outcome that would result from completing the markets
that are missing because of the presence of a public good, but without resorting to
the heroic assumption of price-taking behavior with respect to personalized prices.
Speciﬁcally, we model the collective decision making process with respect to the
provision of public goods as a sequential bargaining game. The sequential nature
of the game reﬂects a realistic feature of the power of setting the agenda of the
negotiation. The proposal and acceptance decisions are endogenous. Agents can
reject a proposal and have it modiﬁed in their turn. Because of the cost of any delay
in reaching an agreement, the bargaining outcome will in general be ineﬃcient, thus
reﬂecting the power of setting the agenda: when there is impatience for reaching an
agreement, the agent who makes an oﬀer that is accepted will extract more rents
at the cost of ineﬃciency. As the impatience or cost of a delay vanishes, those rents
disappear and the allocation is eﬃcient and independent of who had the power of
setting the agenda.
We show that, despite the fact that output decisions for public goods and their
mode of ﬁnancing are often the result of a political process rife with opportunities for
strategic behavior, the Lindahl allocations can be implemented without assuming
price-taking behavior with respect to personalized prices. This is obtained precisely
through a strategic bargaining of the parties over the ﬁnancing of the public good.1
In order to show this we take here a ﬁrst step towards modelling the political process
behind output and ﬁnancing decisions with regard to public goods as a sequential
bargaining game of complete information.
Speciﬁcally, we consider an economy with any ﬁnite number of public goods and
private goods (not necessarily the same number of each). There are two agents in
this economy who take turns alternatingly (as in Rubinstein (1982)) to propose a
maximum level of provision of each of the public goods and a way to split between
them the cost of ﬁnancing any level of the public goods to be provided up to the
1The mixed competitive mechanisms proposed in Groves and Ledyard (1977) obviously can
eﬃciently allocate private and public goods to coincide with the Lindahl allocation (see also Tian
(1989)). However, those direct mechanisms both rely on a centralized mechanism designer and
they may involve complicated mechanisms. The virtue here is that an eﬃcient allocation of private
and public goods is obtained through a decentralized bargaining procedure. It is simple: it relies
explicitly on personalized contributions (taxes) and incorporates the notion that agenda setters
have power to extract more rents when bargaining is costly.
2proposed maxima (this amounts to proposing personalized prices or taxes). The
other agent can then either accept or reject the proposal. In case of acceptance,
this other agent chooses the amount of each public good to be provided (subject
to the maximum amount oﬀered in the proposal). Each agent pays for the public
goods according to the personalized prices agreed upon. The levels of public goods
and their ﬁnancing are ﬁxed thereafter so the game is eﬀectively over. If instead
the other agent rejects the proposal, then it is his turn to make a proposal himself
of a new maximum amounts and personalized prices, and so on.
Within this set-up we show that, as the discount factors of each agent in the
economy converge to one, the allocation of any stationary subgame perfect equi-
librium converges to a Lindahl equilibrium allocation. Speciﬁcally, we show ﬁrst
that, for inﬁnitely patient agents (i.e. for discount factors equal to 1), the set of
Lindahl allocations coincides with the set of stationary subgame perfect equilib-
rium allocations of the alternating-oﬀers bargaining game described above. Then
we establish the upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence mapping, to each pair
of discount factors, the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium allocations of
the bargaining game, and in particular its upper hemicontinuity for discount factors
δA = δB = 1. The conclusion then follows from these two results.
In this simple set-up, unanimity plays an important role in our modelling. In
eﬀect, a tax proposal can be adopted only if it is acceptable to every agent. This
has the virtue of conferring a Wicksellian character to the Lindahl solution to
the public goods problem. In eﬀect, in a classical contribution to the theory of
public ﬁnance, Wicksell (1896) proposed unanimity as the criterion for just taxation.
The game we propose incorporates the need of achieving consensus to eﬀect tax
proposals that to some extent may characterize budgetary procedures in political
regimes with multiple checks and balances or in parliamentary democracies without
a majority party. Ineﬃciencies associated with bargaining are shown to disappear as
agents become increasingly patient. Thus, a Wicksellian procedure turns out to be
consistent with a Lindahl result. Of course, this result depends on the assumption
of complete information.
The formal methods in this paper are related to those of D´ avila and Eeckhout
(2008), who provide a bargaining foundation for Walrasian equilibria in a two-
agent exchange economy in which agents are not price takers. Our formal methods
diﬀer as in providing a bargaining foundation for Lindahl equilibria we consider an
economy with production. While in general there is scope for gains from trade in an
exchange economy, it is not the case that eﬃciency implies a positive provision in
an economy with public goods. Moreover, the feasibility constraint in an economy
with production is diﬀerent from the feasibility constraint in an exchange economy.
As a result, our proof of the equivalence of Lindahl equilibrium allocations and the
allocations resulting from bargaining with patient players is more involved than
that corresponding to Walrasian equilibrium of an exchange economy. Beyond the
formal similarity, the two papers point in very diﬀerent research directions. We
discuss possible extensions of our results in the ﬁnal remarks.
2. The model
We consider a public good economy consisting of two agents A and B, and an
arbitrary number n + m of goods: n private goods x1,...,xn and m public goods
y1,...,ym. The agents are inﬁnitely lived and time is discrete. For each agent
3i = A,B, let xi ∈ Rn
+ be i’s consumption of private goods, and let y ∈ Rm
+ be their
common consumption of public goods. The agents have preferences over the two
types of goods represented by standard utility functions2 uA(xA,y) and uB(xB,y).
The agents are endowed with amounts ei (with total endowment e = eA + eB) of
the private goods. As a normalization, we assume the initial amount of the public
goods is zero. A linear technology M ∈ Rn×m allows to produce each public good
yj by means of the private goods, requiring mij units of private good xi for each
unit of yj, for all i = 1,...,n.
We assume
−Mt(DxuA(eA,0) + DxuB(eB,0)) + (DyuA(eA,0) + DyuB(eB,0)) > 0; (1)
this means that the initial allocation is not Pareto-eﬃcient and there are gains
from agreeing to a positive provision of the public goods—otherwise the collective
decision problem is trivial.
We consider an alternating-oﬀers bargaining game. In any given period prior
to an agreement, an agent i makes an oﬀer consisting of a vector pi = (pxi,pyi) of
prices for the other agent (in terms of, say, the private good x1) and an upper bound
qi to the other agent’s contribution of private goods to the provision of public goods
or, equivalently, to the provision of public goods itself. After receiving an oﬀer the
other agent can either accept it or reject it. In case of acceptance, the accepting
agent chooses his consumption of private goods and the quantities of public goods
to be provided subject to the accepted prices pi and upper bound on trades qi.
This procedure is repeated until a proposal is accepted. The utility of each agent
i is discounted in each iteration by a positive discount factor δi not bigger than 1.
The utility of never reaching an agreement is 0.
It is worth observing that the right to make a proposal can be thought of as a
property right over the surplus from the public good. The details of those property
rights will certainly matter when bargaining is costly —as we will show below.
However, one of our ﬁndings is that the way in which property rights are assigned
does not matter when the cost of a delay disappears.
3. The stationary subgame perfect (SSP) equilibrium allocations
We consider ﬁrst the stationary subgame perfect equilibria without delay of the
bargaining game, that is the SSP equilibria in which no agent has incentives to
reject the oﬀer received. As shown in Lemma 1 in the Appendix, there does not
exist any SSP equilibrium with delay if the agents are impatient, that is to say if
δA,δB < 1.
The SSP equilibria with no delay are characterized by a pair of oﬀers (pA,qA)
and (pB,qB), consisting each of a vector of prices and a maximum amount for
the contributions of private goods, such that (pA,qA) maximizes the utility that A
obtains from B’s immediate acceptance, subject to the constraint that it is indeed
in B’s interest to accept A’s oﬀer, and similarly for (pB,qB).
Formally, (pA,qA) solves
maxuA(eA − ˜ xB(pA,qA) − M˜ yB(pA,qA), ˜ yB(pA,qA)) (2)
2That is to say C2, monotone, diﬀerentiably strictly quasi-concave, non-negative utility func-
tions that are well-behaved at the boundary of Rn+m
+ .
4subject to the constraint
uB(˜ xB(pA,qA),˜ yB(pA,qA)) ≥
δBuB(eB − ˜ xA(pB,qB) − M˜ yA(pB,qB), ˜ yA(pB,qB)),
(3)
where ˜ xB(pA,qA), ˜ yB(pA,qA) is the solution to
maxuB(x,y)
pA · (x − eB,y) ≤ 0
k(x − eB,y)k ≤ qA,
(4)
where k · k stands for the Euclidean norm,3 and symmetrically for (pB,qB).
Note that a SSP equilibrium without delay can equivalently be characterized
by the allocations eﬀectively oﬀered by the agents. In eﬀect, conditional to im-
mediate acceptance, an oﬀer by A of (pA,qA) amounts to oﬀering B the bundle









Conversely, any bundle (xB,y) satisfying the previous inequality is a solution to
B’s problem above for some oﬀer (pA,yA) by A. This fact is established in Lemma
2 in the Appendix.











































It is useful to compare our bargaining game to Rubinstein (1982) bargaining
game. In Rubinstein’s game, a proposing agent faces only one constraint, which is
3The choice of the norm in equation 3 is inessential.
5that the oﬀer be accepted by the responding agent. As a consequence, in Rubinstein
bargaining the proposal made by agent A leaves agent B exactly indiﬀerent between
acceptance and rejection. As is clear from equations (5) and (6), in this paper each
proposer faces an additional constraint which requires that the proposed allocation
be utility maximizing for the responding agent for some combination of prices and
quotas. Thus, in our bargaining game it is not true that the proposing agent
extracts all the surplus of the responding agent.
4. The Lindahl allocations
A Lindahl equilibrium consists of a vector of private good prices px, a vector of
personalized prices for the public goods pA
y ,pB
y , and an allocation (xA,xB,y) such
that
(1) for each agent i = A,B, the agent’s consumption (xi,y) solves
maxui(xi,y)
px(xi − ei) + pi
yy = 0,




(3) the allocation is feasible, i.e. xA,xB,y ≥ 0 and
xA + xB + My = eA + eB.
Note that the zero-proﬁt condition can be derived from feasibility and the budget
constraints for the agents. Therefore, a Lindahl equilibrium allocation (xA,xB,y)
is a feasible allocation such that it allocates to each agent i his demand (xi,y) at his
personalized relative prices, implicitly equal to the marginal rates of substitution









For the case of one private good and one public good, Lindahl equilibrium allo-
cations can be represented in a Kolm triangle, the public goods equivalent of the
Edgeworth box of a private goods exchange economy (see Figure 1 below).4 The
Kolm triangle assumes a linear production technology requiring one unit of the
private good for each unit of the public good. The height of the triangle represents
the initial total endowment of the private good. The orthogonal distance from any
point within the triangle to each of its sides represents each agent’s allocation of
the private good (xA and xB), while the vertical distance to the base of the triangle
represents their common consumption y of the public good. Thus, at the initial
endowment e there is no provision of the public good.
4Thomson (1999) provides a useful presentation and discussion of the Kolm triangle.
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The personalized prices pA and pB represent the terms of exchange of one unit of
public good for pA units of the private good from agent A and pB units of private
good from agent B. A balanced budget where the total contributions equal the
total cost of production of the public good implies that for all y,
PI
i=1 piy = y. For
a given price schedule p, the oﬀer curve OCi gives the optimal amount of public
good and private good demanded by agent i at those terms of trade. An intersection
of the oﬀer curves represents then optimal quantities of the public good and the
private good consumed by the agents given a vector of personalized prices that
balances the budget. This corresponds to a Lindahl equilibrium allocation. There
are of course other eﬃcient allocation represented by the Pareto set P, but they
are not attainable by means of price schedules starting from the initial endowment
e.
5. SSP equilibrium allocations are
Lindahl allocations when δA = δB = 1
First we show that for inﬁnitely patient agents, that is, when the discount factors
δA and δB are 1, the Lindahl equilibrium allocations, and only these allocations, are
oﬀered at a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game above.
Theorem 1. When δA = δB = 1, at every SSP equilibrium with immediate
acceptance the agents’ oﬀers lead to the same allocation. Moreover, this allocation is
a Lindahl equilibrium allocation. Conversely, every Lindahl equilibrium allocation





B,yB) be the feasible allocations resulting from
B’s (resp. A’s) acceptance of A’s (resp. B’s) oﬀer of price and maximum provi-
sions of public goods at a SSP equilibrium with immediate acceptance for inﬁnitely




B,yB) be such that
7(xA
A,xB






































Then, from the ﬁrst-order conditions, there exist multipliers λA, µA, λB, µB ≥ 0




















































































































































B,yB). Since at a SSP equilibrium with








8are binding,5 and hence both allocations are on the same indiﬀerence surface for
both agents,6 then none of these two allocations can be eﬃcient while being diﬀer-
















are collinear cannot hold neither at (xA
A,xB
A,yA) nor at (xA
B,xB
B,yB). In particular,




































We claim that if (16) holds, then equation (13) cannot be satisﬁed for non-negative
multipliers. (A similar argument shows that if the inequality is reversed, then
equation (12) cannot be satisﬁed for nonnegative multipliers.)

























































































Since µB ≥ 0, and the numerator is strictly positive according to (16), so must be



































which is negative since the ﬁrst scalar product is null and the Hessian of uA at
(xA
B,yB) is semi-deﬁnite negative in the space orthogonal to the gradient of uA at
5For instance, since (xA
A,xB
A,yA) satisﬁes DuA(xA,y)(xA − eA,y) ≥ 0 (agent A will never
choose at equilibrium to let B ask for a provision of public goods bigger than the one necessary
to attain A’s demand at the implicit prices), then uB(xB
A,yA) ≤ uB(xB
B,yB) holds as well.
6For this step to hold true it is crucial that δA = δB = 1.
9(xA

















kB = 0. (20)




B,yB)) is collinear to (xA
hB − eA
h,ykB)
up to a positive constant.) It follows that if δA = δB = 1 then at a SSP equilibrium
with immediate acceptance the two agents oﬀer the same allocation.
Let xA,xB,y be the common allocation oﬀered at a SSP equilibrium when δA =
δB = 1. This allocation must be such that
xA + xB + My = eA + eB, (21)
(xA,y) ∈ argmaxuB(e − ˆ xA − Mˆ y, ˆ y)
(uA
x(ˆ xA, ˆ y),uA
y (ˆ xA, ˆ y))









(xB,y) ∈ argmaxuA(e − ˆ xB − Mˆ y, ˆ y)
(uB
x (ˆ xB, ˆ y),uB
y (ˆ xB, ˆ y))

















Then, since both uA and uB are concave,
(xA,y) ∈ argmaxuB(e − ˆ xA − Mˆ y, ˆ y)
uA(ˆ xA, ˆ y) ≥ uA(e − xB − My,y)
given xB,y.
(25)
































































That is, the allocation proposed by both agents at a SSP equilibrium is on both
agents’ oﬀer curves so that it is a Lindahl equilibrium allocation.
Conversely, let xA,xB,y be the allocation of a Lindahl equilibrium, i.e. an allo-
cation such that


























so that xA = ˜ xA(pB,qB), xB = ˜ xB(pA,qA) and ˜ yA(pB,qB) = y = ˜ yB(pA,qA). It
can be easily checked that the Lindahl allocation (xA,xB,y) is the outcome of the
following SSP equilibrium proﬁle of strategies:
(1) A oﬀers (pA,qA) whenever he has the opportunity to do so, and accepts
only oﬀers (p,q) such that
uA(˜ xA(p,q), ˜ yA(p,q)) ≥ δAuA(˜ xA(pB,qB), ˜ yA(pB,qB))
(2) B oﬀers (pB,qB) whenever he has the opportunity to do so, and accepts
only oﬀers (p,q) such that
uB(˜ xB(p,q), ˜ yB(p,q)) ≥ δBuB(˜ xB(pA,qA), ˜ yB(pA,qA)).
Q.E.D.
116. Convergence of SSP equilibrium allocations
to Lindahl allocations as δA,δB → 1
In the relevant case in which bargaining entails some frictions, so that the factors
by which the agents discount future utilities are strictly smaller than 1, any SSP
equilibrium allocation is still arbitrarily close to a Lindahl allocation if agents are
patient enough. This is a consequence of the fact that the correspondence of SSP
equilibrium allocations is upper hemicontinuous with respect to the agents’ discount
factors, as Theorem 2 next establishes.
Theorem 2. Every SSP equilibrium allocation converges to a Lindahl allocation
as δA,δB → 1.
Proof. From Lemma 1 in the Appendix, we know that there are no SSP equilibrium
with delay if δA,δB < 1. thus, it is suﬃcient to show the upper hemicontinuity of
the allocations corresponding to SSP equilibria without delay.






























































where Dui(xi,y) stands for (ui
x(xi,y),ui
y(xi,y)), for all i = A,B. Note that, by
































is a compact-valued, upper hemicontinuous correspondence that depends explicitly
on xB
























xA + xB + My = eA + eB
o
is continuous and compact-valued.
12for agent B’s problem. Therefore, Φ is the cartesian product of compact-valued,
upper hemicontinuous correspondences, and hence it is compact-valued and upper
hemicontinuous itself.8




















Since Φ is compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous, then the correspondence
mapping the ﬁxed points of Φ(·,·,·,·,·,·,δA,δB) to each pair (δA,δB) is upper
hemicontinuous.9
Finally, note that Γ is the correspondence of SSP equilibrium allocations (with-
out delay). Since this correspondence is upper hemicontinuous, in particular at
(δA,δB) = (1,1) and, according to Theorem 1, Γ(1,1) is the set of Lindahl alloca-
tions, then the claim follows.
Q.E.D.
7. Final remarks
In this paper we consider the collective decision problem faced by two agents
who must agree on the output level and ﬁnancing of public goods, and illustrate
that bargaining over tax schedules can provide a foundation for Lindahl equilibrium
allocations. Our bargaining game imposes some constraints on what the what the
proposer is able to oﬀer to the other agent. In particular, in our bargaining game,
as opposed to Rubinstein’s bargaining game, it is not true that the proposing agent
extracts all the surplus of the responding agent.
While for simplicity we develop our results in the context of a two-agent public
good economy, a natural question is how to extend our bargaining game to a situ-
ation with more agents, as in the models considered by Harrington (1989), Baron
and Ferejohn (1989), Banks and Duggan (2000), et al. Consider, for instance, a
three-person society in which the agents alternate in the role of proposer in a ﬁxed
order, a proposal consists as in this paper of a price vector and a quota, and each
agent other than the proposer sequentially decides whether to accept or not the
proposal and in case of acceptance chooses a maximum acceptable level of public
goods. We conjecture that a characterization of allocations corresponding to SSP
equilibria without delay analogous to that given by equations (6) and (7) can be
obtained in this setting, so that Theorems 1 and 2 still hold. We leave this question
open for future research.
Appendix
Lemma 1. If δA,δB < 1, there does not exist any SSP equilibrium with delay.
Proof. Consider a candidate SSP equilibrium (pA,qA) and (pB,qB) in which, for
instance, B rejects and A accepts. Let (xA
B,xB
B,yB) be the feasible allocation re-
sulting from A’s acceptance of B’s oﬀer of price and maximum provisions of public
goods.
8See Lemma A1 in D´ avila and Eeckhout (2008).
9See Lemma A3 in D´ avila and Eeckhout (2008).
13Suppose that (xA
B,xB
B,yB) is eﬃcient. Then A could deviate oﬀering himself
B’s oﬀer instead, since A will accept it anyway later, saving the cost of delay in
reaching an agreement. Since (xA
B,xB
B,yB) is eﬃcient, there is a price vector such
that if oﬀered this price and a nonbinding quota, B would choose this allocation.
Suppose that (xA
B,xB
B,yB) is ineﬃcient. Then there is room for A deviating ad
making an oﬀer that is eﬃcient and Pareto improving with respect to (xA
B,xB
B,yB)
and that B would accept.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. If (x,y) solves
maxu(x,y)
p · (x − e,y) ≤ 0
k(x − e,y)k ≤ q,
(A.1)







and conversely, if x satisﬁes (A.2), then there exist p,q for which x solves (A.1).
Proof. Assume q > 0, otherwise (A.2) is trivially satisﬁed. Since x solves (A.1),
then there exist λ,µ ≥ 0 such that
Du(x,y) = λp + µ(x − e,y)
λp(x − e,y) = 0
µ[(x − e)t(x − e) + yty − q2] = 0.
(A.3)
Therefore,
Du(x,y)(x − e,y) = λp(x − e,y) + µ(x − e,y)(x − e,y)|
= µ(x − e,y)(x − e,y) ≥ 0.
(A.4)




q2 = (x − e,y)(x − e,y).
(A.5)















q2 = (x − e,y)(x − e,y),
(A.6)
14where the weak inequality follows from the fact that if a ∈ Rn
++ and b / ∈ Rn
+ are






10See Lemma A2 in D´ avila and Eeckhout (2008).
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